Abstract: Considering a checkpoint and communication pattern, the Rollback Dependency Trackability (RDT) property stipulates that there is no hidden dependency between local checkpoints. In other words, if there is a dependency between two checkpoints due to a non-causal sequence of messages, then there must exist a causal sequence of messages that \doubles" the non-causal one and that establishes the same dependency.
Introduction
A distributed computation consists of a nite set of processes connected by a communication network, that communicate and synchronize only by exchanging messages through the network. A local checkpoint is a recorded local state of a process. When a process has to record such a local state, we say that this process takes a (local) checkpoint. With each distributed computation is thus associated a checkpoint and communication pattern, de ned from the set of messages and local checkpoints. A global checkpoint is a set of local states, one from each process, and a consistent global checkpoint is a global checkpoint such that no message sent by a process after its local checkpoint is received by another process before its local checkpoint. The determination of consistent global checkpoints is an important task that has many applications such as: detection of global properties of distributed computations 1, 3, 6] , determination of distributed breakpoints 5, 11] and rollback-recovery 4] to name a few.
In general, the fact that two local checkpoints be not causally related is a necessary but not su cient condition for them to belong to the same consistent global checkpoint. They can have "hidden" dependencies that make impossible for them to belong to the same consistent global checkpoint. These dependencies are characterized by the fact they cannot be tracked with transitive dependency vectors. Netzer and Xu 12] have shown that dependencies between local checkpoints are due to the occurrence of particular sequences of messages occurring in a checkpoint and communication pattern, called Z-paths. Two categories of Z-paths have been identi ed: causal and non-causal. A causal Z-path is one in which the delivery event of each message of the sequence is causally dependent of the send event of the message that immediately precedes it in the sequence; such Z-paths create causal dependencies between pairs of local checkpoints, i.e., dependencies that are on-line trackable (e.g., by using a transitive dependency vector). On the contrary, non-causal Z-paths create \hidden" dependencies, i.e., dependencies that are not on-line trackable. However, if a non-causal Z-path is doubled by a causal one, i.e., if the pair of checkpoints related by this non-causal Z-path is also related by a causal Z-path, then this dependency is no more hidden, and can be tracked on-line (in that case we say that the non-causal Z-path is causally doubled). To formalize this situation, Wang 15] has de ned the Rollback-Dependency Trackability (RDT) property. A checkpoint and communication pattern satis es this property if all dependencies between local checkpoints are on-line trackable, in other words if all Z-paths occurring in this pattern are causally doubled. RDT has two noteworthy properties: (1) It ensures that any set of local checkpoints that are not pairwise causally related can be extended to form a consistent global checkpoint; (2) It enjoys e cient calculations of the minimum and the maximum consistent global checkpoints that contain a given set of local checkpoints. As a consequence, the RDT property has applications in a large family of dependability problems such as: distributed software diagnosis, consistent deadlock recovery, output commit, etc 15] .
In this paper we are interested in determining properties on Z-paths such that, if all the Z-paths satisfying such a property are causally doubled, then the RDT property holds (of course, the converse is always true, by de nition of RDT). Such properties will be called RDT-compliants. Each RDTcompliant property establishes a su cient characterization of the RDT property, in the sense that it is su cient to check that all Z-paths satisfying this property are causally doubled in order to check the RDT property. However, to our knowledge, a necessary and su cient characterization of the RDT property has not yet been stated. By this is meant the problem of nding a RDT-compliant property on Z-paths, which is implied by no other RDT-compliant property. The rst contribution of this paper is a solution to this problem. This is done by introducing successive properties on Z-paths, more and more constrained, namely : Z-paths of order two, Causal-Message-Z-paths (CM-paths), Simple-Causal-Message-Z-paths (SCM-paths), Elementary-Simple-Causal-Message-Z-paths (ESCMpaths) and nally Prime-Elementary-Simple-Causal-Message-Z-paths (PESCM-paths). The following PI n 1107 results are then proved: 1) PESCM is RDT-compliant (a characterization of RDT) (2) For every RDT-compliant property X on Z-paths, we have PESCM ) X (so, this characterization is optimal).
The previous result is important not only from a theoretical point of view, but also from a practical one, when considering the task of maintaining the RDT property on the y and without adding control messages while letting processes to take local checkpoints independently. Protocols that achieve this goal track Z-paths satisfying a RDT-compliant property, and force processes to take additional local checkpoints when those Z-paths are perceived as not causally doubled (Such local checkpoints are said to \break" the corresponding Z-path). Such protocols have already been proposed in the literature (e.g., 13, 14, 15] ). Obviously, the stronger is the RDT-compliant property considered, the more e cient is the protocol, in the sense that there will be less Z-paths to consider for potential breaking. The second contribution of the paper is the design of a new protocol, based on the previous minimal PESCM-path subset. A family F RDT of checkpointing protocols ensuring the RDT property is introduced. This family follows the communication-induced 1 checkpointing approach: processes take independently local checkpoints (called basic checkpoints) and the protocol requires them to take additional local checkpoints (called forced checkpoints) in order to maintain RDT; this is achieved only by piggybacking control information on application messages. Also, F RDT is based on the following basic hypotheses. (i) On the y: no knowledge of the \future" of the computation is available, i.e., the usable knowledge of the computation at a certain event can not be more than the one included in the causal past of that event.
(ii) The computational model is fully asynchronous (no private information -such as clock speed-about other processes is available and message transfer delays are arbitrary). The new protocol proposed in the paper belongs to that family. It is shown that it is optimal within the family in terms of the number of forced checkpoints and that it achieves this optimality by using a minimal size of control information piggybacked on messages of the computation. It attains this goal by a subtle tracking of causal dependencies on already taken checkpoints; this tracking is then used to prevent the occurrence of hidden dependencies due to PESCM-paths which are non-causally doubled. Finally, it is shown that the proposed protocol contains some previously known non-optimal protocols of the family. These protocols show there is a tradeo between the size of the control information piggybacked on applications messages and the number of forced checkpoints that are taken. This set includes many communication-induced checkpointing protocols proposed in the literature such as Checkpoint-Before-Receive, No-Receive-After-Send 13], FDAS 15] and FDI 14] .
The paper is structured in six main sections. Sections 2 and 3 introduce checkpoints and RDT, respectively. Then Section 4 presents the optimal characterization of the RDT property. Section 5 presents the F RDT family of communication-induced checkpointing protocols. The new protocol and its comparison with other protocols of the family are presented in Section 6. Finally Section 7 concludes the paper.
Consistent Global Checkpoints

Distributed Computations
A distributed computation consists of a nite set P of n processes fP 1 ; P 2 ; : : : ; P n g connected by a communication network, that communicate and synchronize only by exchanging messages through the network. We assume that each ordered pair of processes is connected by an asynchronous directed logical channel whose transmission delays are unpredictable. Each process runs on a processor. Processors do not share either a common memory or a common clock value; there is no bound for their relative speeds.
A process can execute internal, send and delivery statements. An internal statement does not involve communication. When P i executes the statement \send(m) to P j " it puts the message m into the channel from P i to P j . When P i executes the statement \deliver(m)", it is blocked until at least one message directed to P i has arrived; then a message is withdrawn from one of its input channels and delivered to P i . Executions of internal, send and delivery statements are modeled by internal, sending and delivery events. H is a set of local checkpoints de ned on b H. C i;x represents the x-th local checkpoint of process P i . The local checkpoint C i;x corresponds to some local state i;s with x s. Figure 1 shows an example of checkpoint and communication pattern. We assume that each process P i takes an initial local checkpoint C i;0 (corresponding to i;0 ), and after each event a checkpoint will eventually be taken. Thus, each process always begins, and ends, with a checkpoint. A message m sent by process P i to process P j is called orphan with respect to the ordered pair of local checkpoints (C i;x ,C j;y ) if the delivery of m belongs to C j;y while its sending event does not belong to C i;x . An ordered pair of local checkpoints is consistent if and only if there are no orphan messages with respect to this pair. For example, Figure 1 shows the pair (C k;1 ,C j;1 ) is consistent, while the pair (C i;2 ,C j;2 ) is inconsistent (because of orphan message m 5 ).
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Global Checkpoints
A global checkpoint is a set of local checkpoints one from each process. For example, fC i;1 ; C j;1 ; C k;1 g and fC i;2 ; C j;2 ; C k;1 g are two global checkpoints depicted in the Figure 1 . De nition 2.3 A global checkpoint is consistent if all its pairs of local checkpoints are consistent.
For example, Figure 1 shows that fC i;1 ; C j;1 ; C k;1 g is a consistent global checkpoint, while fC i;2 ; C j;2 ; C k;1 g
is not consistent (due to the inconsistent pair (C i;2 ; C j;2 )). A Z-path with only one message is causal. A causal Z-path will also be called a causal path.
Notation. The following notation will be used in the rest of the paper. In a Z-path , the rst (resp. the last) message will be denoted :first (resp. :last). The length of a Z-path is the number of messages forming and will be denoted as j j. Let 6 ]. Note that, by construction, every causal Z-path is causally doubled (by itself!). Thus, the only interesting notion is that of non-causal Z-path doubling. Irisa 
Rollback-Dependency Trackability
The following concept, Rollback-Dependency Trackability, has been introduced by Wang in 15] . It can be de ned as follows 2 De nition 4.1 With each Z-path let's associate its traversal sequence P j ; P k 1 ; : : : ; P k ; P i , which is the sequence of processes traversed by . We say that is elementary if its traversal sequence has no repetition.
Note that the length of an elementary Z-path is n ? 1. We have the following lemma: Lemma 4.1 Every causal Z-path is causally doubled by an elementary causal Z-path. Proof Let be a causal Z-path from I j;y to I i;x . If is elementary, then the result holds. Though expressed di erently, this de nition is equivalent to Wang's one.
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If is not elementary, let P k be a process occurring at least twice in its traversal sequence ( Figure   2 ) 3 . Thus, can be expressed as 1 2 , where 1 ; ; 2 are causal Z-paths respectively from I j;y to I k;z , from I k;z 0 to I k;z 00 and from I k;z 000 to I i;x , with z z 0 z 00 z 000 , and j 1 2 j<j j. Note that, if k = j then 1 is empty and 2 is from I j;y 0 to I i;x with y y 0 . Similarly, if k = i, then 2 is empty and 1 is from I j;y to I i;x 0 with x 0 x. In the other cases, 1 2 is a causal Z-path from I i;x to I j;y . Thus, in every case, 0 = 1 2 is a causal Z-path from I i;x 0 to I j;y 0 with x x 0 , y 0 y and j 0 j<j j. If 0 is elementary, then the lemma is proved. Otherwise, the previous construction can be repeated : each step removes at least one repetition in the traversal sequence and thus, after a nite number of steps we obtain an elementary causal Z-path from I j;y to I i;x with y y, x x. Proof Let doubled(`) denote the predicate:\all Z-paths of order`are causally doubled". By the lemma assumption, doubled(2) is true. Thus, it is su cient to show that, for all` 2, doubled(`) ) doubled(`+ 1).
Z-path to be doubled : : ` `+1 be a Z-path of order`+1 from I i;x to I j;y ( Figure 3 ). Since 0 = 1 2 : : : ì s a Z-path of order`from I i;x to, say I k;z , there exists a causal Z-path from I i;x 0 to I k;z 0 with x x 0 and z 0 z. Since `+1 is a causal Z-path from I k;z to I j;y , we have `+1 is a Z-path of order 1 or 2, 3 In all gures of Section 4.1, letters such as x, y, etc. near process lines indicate checkpoint intervals indexes.
Irisa from I i;x 0 to I j;y . From the lemma assumption, this Z-path is causally doubled and thus there exists a causal Z-path from I i;x 00 to I j;y 0 with x 0 x 00 and y 0 y. Thus, x x 00 and y 0 y, which shows that is causally doubled by . By the lemma assumption, doubled (1) is true. Thus, it is su cient to show that, for all` 1,
Z-path to be doubled Z-path from I p;t 0 to I j;y , with t t 0 and j 0 2 j=`; 1 m] is a CM-path from I i;x to I p;t . By the lemma assumption, there exists a causal Z-path from I i;x 0 to I p;t 00 with x x 0 and t 00 t. The Z-path 0 2 from I i;x 0 to I j;y is either causal and since x x 0 it is a causal doubling of . Or it is a (+;`)-Z-path of order two (this the case shown on the gure, where t = t 0 = t 00 must hold) and thus there exists a causal Z-path 0 from I i;x 00 to I j;y 0 with x 0 x 00 and y 0 y; thus, x x 00 and is causally doubled by 0 . In other words, a simple causal path does not \include" local checkpoints. Note that a non-simple causal path can be written as = 1 2 : : : `, where each component i is simple, and there is a local checkpoint between the events deliver( i :last) and send( i+1 :first). In the checkpoint and communication pattern shown in Figure 1 (1) is true. Thus, it is su cient to show that, for each` 1, doubled(`) ) doubled(`+ 1). Let `+1 ` : : : 1 m] a CM-path from I i;x to I j;y ( Figure 5 ). By construction, `+1 ` : : : 1 is causal and each i (1 i `+1) is simple. Suppose that `+1 is from I i;x to I k;z . Thus, ` : : : 1 m] is a CM-path (whose causal part is composed of`simple causal paths) from I k;z 0 to I j;y , with z < z 0 . By induction assumption, this CM-path is doubled; thus, there exists a causal path 0 , from I k;z 00 to I j;y 0, with z 0 z 00 and y 0 y. Since z < z 00 , the event deliver( `+1 :last) occurs on P k before the event send( 0 :first) and thus `+1 0 is a causal path from I i;x to I j;y 0, with y 0 y. This shows that the CM-path `+1 ` : : : 1 Proof Let = m] be a SCM-path, where is from I j;y to I i;x and m from I i;x to I k;z .
If is elementary, then is causally doubled, by the lemma assumption.
If is not elementary then, from lemma 4.1, there exists a causal Z-path from I j;y to I i;x with y y, x x and is elementary. Thus, m is a Z-path from I j;y to I k;z with y y. If it is causal, then it is a causal doubling of . If it is not causal, then it is an ESCM-path. From the lemma assumption, there exits a causal Z-path form I j;y 0 to I k;z 0 with y y 0 and z 0 z; since y y y 0 , is causally doubled by . De nition 4.6 A causal path from I j;y to I i;x is prime if it is minimum in C(j; y)(i; x).
In other words, if is a prime causal path from I j;y to I i;x then all causal paths 0 from I j;y 0 to I i;x with y y 0 satisfy 0 . Intuitively, a prime causal path from I j;y to I i;x is the rst one including the existence of checkpoint C j;y?1 into the causal past of P 0 i s current state. In other words, a PESCM-path is a Z-path m] of order two, where is a prime, simple and elementary causal path and m is sent before and in the same interval than the delivery of :last. If is prime, then is causally doubled, by the lemma assumption. If is not prime, the set C(j; y)(i; x) is not empty and thus it has a minimum 0 (see Figure 6 ).
The latter is a prime causal Z-path from I j;y 0 to I i;x , with y y 0 . If it is not elementary, then, from Lemma 4.1, there is an elementary causal Z-path from I j;y to I i;x with y 0 y, x x. Since 0 is PI n 1107 prime, ( 0 :last) and ( :last) are the same message and thus is a PESCM-path from I j;y to I i;x with y y. By the lemma assumption, it is causally doubled. Thus, there exists a causal Z-path from I j;y 00 to I k;z 0, with y y 00 and z 0 z. Since 
PESCM-cycles
The previous section showed that an optimal characterization of RDT rests on some property veri ed by a particular class of Z-paths, namely, PESCM-paths. Contrarily to an elementary causal path, in the traversal sequence of a PESCM-path = m], the rst process (where :first is sent) and the last process (where m is delivered) can be the same. In such a case the PESCM-path is from an interval I i;x to another interval I i;x 0 of the same process P i . There are two cases: either x x 0 , and in that case, is causally doubled, by De nition 3.3 ( Figure  7.a) ; or x 0 < x and in that case, is called a PESCM-cycle (Figure 7.b) . PESCM-cycles have the following property: Lemma 4.8 A PESCM-cycle cannot be causally doubled. Proof Let be a PESCM-cycle from I i;x to I i;x 0 with x 0 < x. By the way of contradiction, let us assume that is causally doubled by a causal Z-path. Let this causal z-path from I i;x 00 to I i;x 000 with x x 00 and x 000 x 0 . So we have: x 000 x 0 < x x 00 i.e., x 000 < x 00 . This is impossible as we consider that the event deliver( :last) would precede itself according to the happened-before relation ( hb !) which is acyclic. 2 Irisa 
Optimality of the Characterization
In this section, we consider properties de ned on Z-paths, and give a de nition of RDT-compliance. Then it is shown that the characterization stated in Theorem 4.7 is optimal, in the sense that the PESCM property cannot be implied by any other RDT-compliant property.
Given a property X de ned on Z-paths, with each checkpoint and communication pattern ( b
is associated the set of Z-paths that satisfy X in this pattern. These Z-paths will be called X-paths; it is important to note that an X-path is related to a particular checkpoint and communication pattern while the property X itself is de ned independently of a particular pattern. The previous section has
shown examples of such properties and of the corresponding Z-paths (e.g., the PESCM property and its corresponding notion of PESCM-paths).
De nition 4. The optimality result can now be formally stated:
PI n 1107 Theorem 4.11 (Optimality of RDT characterization) Let X be a property de ned on Z-paths. If X is RDT-compliant, then PESCM ) X. Proof It is equivalent to prove the contrapositive of the theorem, i.e., if :(PESCM ) X) then X is not RDT-compliant. In other words, if there exists a checkpoint and communication pattern such that the set of X-paths is not included in the set of PESCM-paths, then there exists a checkpoint and communication pattern (not necessarily the same) in which all X-paths are causally doubled and that does not satisfy the RDT-property.
Suppose :(PESCM ) X). We have two cases: 1. X is a property such that the existence of PESCM-paths does not imply the existence of X-paths (for example, " traverses the processes in a give order" falls into this category). 
A Family of RDT Protocols
In this section we rst introduce a particular family of checkpointing protocols that ensure the RDT property (F RDT ). Then we give a characterization of RDT with respect to protocols belonging to such a family.
Structure of Processes
A checkpointing protocol (or CP) is a distributed computation involving processes having the following structure: We assume that each process consists of an application layer (AL) and a checkpointing layer (CL), as illustrated in Figure 10 . The application layer at each process can issue send and takeckpt events to the CL and can accept delivery from the CL. CL can issue net-send events to the network and ckpt event to the system and accept net-receive events from the network. We say that a message is sent when the corresponding send event is produced; a message is received when the corresponding net-receive is generated; a message is delivered when a delivery event is produced. A checkpoint is taken when the corresponding ckpt event is generated by CL to the system that, in turn, saves the current local state on stable storage.
It is assumed that each process takes basic checkpoints at its own pace: basic checkpoints correspond to take-ckpt events produced by AL. Hence, a CL layer takes some communication-induced With each basic-checkpoint C i;x are associated the following events: take ckpt(C i;x ) (on AL i ) and ckpt(C i;x ) (on CL i ), and take ckpt(C i;x ) hb ! ckpt(C i;x ). With each forced checkpoint C i;x is associated the event ckpt(C i;x ) (on CL i ).
The Class of F RDT Protocols
A protocol CP belongs to F RDT if (i) it ensures the RDT property and (ii) it satis es the following hypotheses:
H1 : Usable Knowledge. The usable knowledge of an event e is the knowledge of the checkpoint and communication pattern that belongs to the e's causal past. H2 : On-line decision on the receipt of application messages. Upon the receipt of a message m, CP has to decide on-the-y (without introducing additional delays) if it takes a forced checkpoint before delivering m to the application. This decision is based on the usable knowledge at the time of m's receipt.
H3 : No control messages among CLs. CP's decisions have to be based on the information local at each CL and the control information piggybacked by application messages received by CL. H4 : No computation meaning. CP cannot interpret the application's message contents or modify the underlying application (e.g, by delaying arbitrarily application messages or delaying or invalidating the action to take basic checkpoints). Intuitively a causal doubling of a PESCM-path is visible at process P i upon the receipt of the message :last, if the causal path 0 , which causally doubles , belongs to the causal past of the event receipt( :last).
The following characterization of visibility shows that the existence of a causal doubling 0 of the PESCM-path from I k;z to I j;y can be learnt by P i only through the information carried on the message :last (see the Figure 11 ). ( Figure 11.a) . But the causal path 0 is before in the totally ordered set C(k; i)(I k;z ; I i;x ), and this contradicts the fact that is Prime. Thus, deliver ( 0 ) hb ! send( :last) (Figure 11.b) .
ii)Conversely, the result is obvious, since deliver( 0 :last) hb ! send( :last) ) deliver( 0 last) hb ! Usable knowledge larger than the causal past of an event (violation of H1). As an extreme, the usable knowledge could be the nal checkpointing and communication pattern.
CL i took a forced checkpoint after the sending of message m in order to break (violation of H2).
Using control messages among CPs layer of distinct processes in order to inform CL i that, at the time of the receipt of :last, has been causally doubled (violation of H3). Know at the time of send( 0 :first) that the causal path 0 will reach P j and then force some process to wait before either taking a basic checkpoint or delivering a message (violation of H4). know at which time another process will take a basic checkpoint and the transmission delay of messages over the network (violation of H5).
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In any of the previous cases CP does not belong to the F RDT and then the assumption is contradicted and the claim follows. In the following, for the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, we refer to a process P i , merging actually the checkpointing protocol layer CP i with the application layer AL i .
Tracking PESCM-Paths
Consider the situation where a message m is received by a process P i , in an interval I i;x . This message forms CM-paths m 0 ] with all causal paths such that m = :last and all messages m 0 sent by P i in the interval I i;x , before the receipt of m. Among all these CM-paths, P i has to x the set of pairs of processes (k; j) such that there exists a PESCM-paths m 0 ] from process P k to process P j that include m as :last.
Irisa
To detect the set of processes to which P i has sent messages in its current checkpoint interval, each process P i keeps an array of booleans sent to i such that, for all j (1 j n), sent to i j] is true if and only if P i has sent a message to P j since its last local checkpoint. Thus, to the knowledge of P i at the receipt of m, the set of Prime CM-paths from process P k to process P j with m = :last is given by the set of pair (k; j) such that:
Tracking simple paths
To detect the set of processes P k such that there exists a simple causal path (with m = :last) from P k to P i , each process P i maintains a vector simple i 1::n] of booleans, with the following meaning: for all k (1 k n), simple i k] is true if, to the knowledge of P i , all causal paths from C k;D i k] to C i;D i i] are simple. The consistency of simple i is maintained by P i as follows: simple i i] is permanently true. when P i takes a local checkpoint (including the initial one), it resets all entries simple i k] (with k 6 = i) to false.
when P i sends a message m, the array simple i is piggybacked on this message; when a message m (sent by P`) is delivered to P i : observe that, for each k, m:simple k] is the value of simple` k] when m has been sent. Thus, to the knowledge of P i at the receipt of m, the set of Prime and Simple CM-paths from process P k to process P j with m = :last is given by the set of pair (k; j) such that:
Tracking elementary causal paths
Since there is an elementary prime and simple causal path from P k to P i , with :last = m, if and only if there is a prime and simple causal path 0 from P k to P i , with 0 :last = m, no extra data is necessary to check whether a causal path with :last = m is elementary or not. Thus, to the knowledge of P i at the receipt of m, there exists a PESCM-path m 0 ] from process P k to process P j with :last = m, if and only if the following condition holds:
6.2 Breaking All Non-Visibly-Doubled PESCM-Paths Let us remark that if P i takes a local checkpoint before the delivery of m, it breaks all PESCM-paths m 0 ] such that :last = m. On the contrary, if P i does not take a local checkpoint before the delivery of m, none of these PESCM-paths is broken. Thus, if, to the knowledge of P i , at least one PESCM-path m 0 ] (such that :last = m) is not causally doubled, P i must take a forced checkpoint before the delivery of m to prevent the formation of a PESCM-path non-visibly doubled (Corollary 5.3). In the next two Sections, we address rst the case of PESCM-paths from P k to P j when k = j (PESCM-cycles), then the case of PESCM-paths from P k to P j when k 6 = j.
Breaking PESCM-cycles (k = j)
As we have already seen in Section 4.2.2, PESCM cycles cannot be causally doubled. Thus, they must be broken as soon as they are detected. Such a situation occurs when, upon the receipt of a message m, a process P i detects a PESCM-path m 0 ] ( :last = m) from P k to P j with k = j, i.e., when the condition (see Figure 11 and Proposition 5.1)"? This information concerns the existence of causal paths between intervals throughout the set of intervals. It is managed as follows:
Each process P i keeps a boolean matrix causal i , such that, for all (k; j) ( This condition means that, to the knowledge of P i , there exists at least one PESCM-path from P k to P j which is non-visibly doubled. If it is evaluated to true, then the protocol forces P i to take a local checkpoint before delivering m.
Summary
The two previous sections showed that, when a message m is received by P i , this process has to to take a forced local checkpoint before delivering m if and only if one of the two conditions C 1 or C 2 is evaluated to true. This is summarized by the condition C (C 1 _ C 2 ): C 9(k; 
Formal Description of the Checkpointing Protocol
Each process P i is endowed with the following arrays whose semantics has been de ned in the previous sections. 6.4 Optimality
Number of forced checkpoints
Let CP denote the protocol presented in the previous section. We show that CP is optimal with respect to (#f ckpt(CP)). Suppose that there is a protocol CP 0 belonging to the class F RDT , such that (#f ckpt(CP 0 )) < (#f ckpt(CP)). The protocol CP 0 bases its decision to force processes taking local checkpoints on a condition C 0 , evaluated upon the receipt of each message.
Let us denote pat and pat 0 the checkpoint and communication patterns produced by the application and the protocols CP and CP 0 respectively. By assumption, there is a message m such that, upon the receipt of m at a process P i , CP forces P i to take a local checkpoint C, whilst CP 0 does not force P i to take this checkpoint (i.e., C 0 ) C). As CP forces P i to take C, there exits in pat a PESCM-path = m 0 ], with last = m, which is not visibly doubled. Since CP 0 does not force P i to take A and belongs to the class F RDT , must be visibly doubled in pat 0 . But pat 0 is obtained from pat by removing the local (forced) checkpoint C. Thus, must be also visibly doubled in pat, a contradiction.
Size of data structures
To show the optimality of the protocol CP with respect to the size of data structure either stored by processes or piggybacked on messages, we proceed by \omission": if CP 0 is a protocol derived from CP in which a single entry of one of the arrays simple, causal or D is omitted on a single message, then there exist checkpoint and communication patterns such that, either CP 0 is no more optimal in terms of number of forced checkpoints, or the pattern does not satisfy any more the RDT property (according to the \default" value chosen to replace the missing entry). Let us remark that if only a process does not store even a single entry of one of those arrays, then there can be a message where this entry will be omitted, so it is su cient to analyze the situation where entries are omitted on messages. If m:simple ] has the default value false, then condition C will be evaluated to true, and P will be forced to take a checkpoint before delivering m, although this might not be necessary, as shown by Figure 13 .a.
If m:simple ] has the default value true, then condition C will be evaluated to false, and P will not be forced to take a checkpoint before delivering m. So, the RDT property will be violated, as shown by Figure 13 If m:simple ] has the default value false, then condition C will be evaluated to false and P i will not be forced to take a checkpoint before delivering m. So, the RDT property will be violated (see Figure 13 .c). 
Size of Control Information vs Number of Forced Checkpoints
Several variants of the protocol CP can be obtained by weakening the predicate C, i.e., by replacing C by a weaker predicate C 0 (thus C ) C 0 ) in the test performed upon the arrival of a message m to decide whether a forced checkpoint must be taken. Obviously, weakening the predicate C leads to variants taking at least as many forced checkpoints as CP, since the implication C ) C 0 shows that each time CP takes a forced checkpoint, then the variant based on C 0 takes also a forced checkpoint. However, weakening of condition C allows to decrease the size of the control information piggybacked on application messages, and thus these variants show a tradeo between the size of the control information and the number of forced checkpoints while ensuring the RDT property: the bigger is the the number of forced checkpoints, the smaller is the control information piggybacked on application messages.
Before examining some of these variants, let us remark that, since by construction, The corresponding protocol breaks all non-visibly doubled PESCM-paths and all PESCM-paths from a process to itself (cycle) whether doubled or not (it supposes that all such cycles are non-simple).
No-PESCM-Path(j 6 = k). If matrices causal are omitted, i.e., evaluated to false by default, the predicate C is weakened to: C :PESCM(j6 =k) 9(k; In such a case we obtain a protocol that does not allow the existence of any PECM-path from P k to P j with j 6 = k, whether simple or not, whether causally doubled or not. In such a case we obtain a protocol that does not allow the existence of any PECM-path or cycle, whether simple or not, whether causally doubled or not. Each application message piggybacks D as control information. We would like to remark that in this case the vector send to might be replaced by a simple boolean ag after first send. Doing so we exactly get the Fixed-Dependency-After-Send Only-Causal-Paths. Another variant can be obtained by avoiding the presence of any non-causal Z-path (see Section 3.1) by preventing the formation of any break point (i.e., a send-delivery sequence in a checkpoint interval). This can be done by using the following predicate:
C :NCP 9j : (sent to i j])
In such a case each time a message is received by process a P i after a send event a forced checkpoint is taken in order to break the sequence. This protocol is purely \syntactic" in the sense it does not use control information piggybacked on application messages. Also in this case the vector send to might be replaced by a simple boolean ag after first send. In this way we get Russell's Algorithm 13].
It is clear that C :NCP is weaker than C :PECM .
No-Causal-Dependency. If we take a checkpoint each time we receive a dependency vector D that brings at least one new information about another process, we actually avoid the occurrence of any causal dependency between the newly-learnt checkpoint interval and the current checkpoint interval. This is done by using the following predicate: Only-One-Delivery. If a forced checkpoint is taken each time a message is received, every checkpoint interval contains at most one delivery event. This corresponds to the ultimate weakening of C to the tautology. Of course, the tautology is the weakest of all predicates and thus, this protocol is the least e cient in terms of number of forced checkpoints. Figure 5 summarizes the discussion of Section 6.5. In that gure, a plain arrow from CP1 to CP2
indicates that (#f ckpt(CP1)) (#f ckpt(CP2)) and a dotted arrow indicates that jctrl infj(CP1) jctrl infj(CP2).
Conclusion
Considering a checkpoint and communication pattern, the Rollback Dependency Trackability (RDT) property stipulates that there is no hidden dependency between local checkpoints. In other words, if there is a dependency between two checkpoints due to a non-causal message chain, then there must exist a causal message chain that \doubles" the non-causal one and that establishes the same dependency. This paper has provided a minimal characterization of the RDT property. This characterization de nes the smallest set of non-causal sequences of messages that have to be doubled in order to ensure the RDT property. A new protocol belonging to that family of communication-induced checkpointing protocols has been presented and it has been shown that this protocol is optimal in terms of the number of forced checkpoints and in terms of the size of data structures it requires. The protocol attains this goal by a subtle tracking of causal dependencies on already taken checkpoints; this tracking is then used to prevent the occurrence of hidden dependencies.
Finally a set of non-optimal protocols have been derived from the optimal one. These derivations showed a tradeo between the size of the control information required by a protocol and the number of forced checkpoints it takes.
